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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS-
EQUAL PROTECTION-SEX DISCRIMINATION-The United States
Supreme Court has held that enactment of a male-only draft
registration requirement does not violate the equal protection
component of the fifth amendment due process clause.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
On June 16, 1971, the plaintiffs, potential inductees,' filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania seeking a declaratory judgment that the Military
Selective Service Act (MSSA)2 was unconstitutional.3 Their re-
quest to convene a three-judge district court was denied,
however, because the allegations of unconstitutionality did not
reach the threshold requirements necessary to give a three-
judge court subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal,' the district
court's ruling was affirmed, except for the plaintiffs' claim that
the MSSA unconstitutionally discriminated between males and
females. On remand, the district court denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint and convened a three-judge
court to decide the issue of unlawful gender-based discrimina-
tion.6
1. The original plaintiffs were Lewis Rowland, David Freudberg, and
David B. Sitman, Goldberg v. Tarr, 510 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The
original named defendant was Curtis Tarr, then Director of the Selective Ser-
vice System.
2. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-462 (1981). See infra note 9.
3. The plaintiffs' five-count complaint alleged: (1) a taking of property
without due process, (2) involuntary servitude, (3) unconstitutional discrimina-
tion between the sexes, (4) infringement of the rights of free speech and
peaceful assembly, and (5) the unconstitutionality of the Vietnam War.
4. Rowland v. Tarr, 341 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Jurisdiction was
asserted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201, & 2202 (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 &
1985; and U.S CONST. amends. I, V, IX, X & XIII. The threshold requirement of
a substantial Constitutional question, see 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1980), was not met
because the complaint alleged unconstitutionality of the draft in its entirety,
and clearly it was within Congress's power to adopt the MSSA. 341 F. Supp. at
341.
5. Rowland v. Tarr, 480 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1973). Upon remand, the district
court was to determine if the discrimination claim was substantial enough to
warrant the convening of a three-judge district court and to determine whether
plaintiffs had standing. 341 F. Supp. at 342.
6. Rowland v. Tarr, 378 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Defendant asserted
that the question was moot because the legislation permitting induction had
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On March 19, 1975, President Ford ended draft registration7
and the case lay dormant.8 On July 2, 1980, President Carter
signed a Proclamation that reinstated draft registration. 9 On July
1, 1980 the district court had certified a plaintiff class composed
of all males who are required to register under the MSSA or are
liable for training under the MSSA. The three-judge panel per-
manently enjoined male-only draft registration, finding that sec-
tion 3 of the MSSA unconstitutionally discriminated between
males and females because it was not substantially related to a
government interest. 10
On July 19, 1980, Justice Brennan, circuit justice for the Third
Circuit, stayed the order enjoining commencement of the draft."
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction,"
and held that enactment of male-only draft registration was
within the constitutional authority of Congress."
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, 4 examined
lapsed. Presidential Proclamation No. 4360, 3A C.F.R. 33 (1975). This assertion
was dismissed on July 1, 1974, because the three-judge district court reasoned
that the plaintiffs were still under no obligation to register for the draft. 378 F.
Supp. at 768.
7. Presidential Proclamation No. 4360, 3A C.F.R. 33 (1975).
8. On June 25, 1975, Robert L. Goldberg intervened as a party plaintiff,
and on July 22, 1975, the motions of the original plaintiffs to be dismissed were
granted. 510 F. Supp. at 292.
9. Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45247 (1980). Presi-
dent Carter's action was prompted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 50
U.S.C. App. § 453 (1981) provides in pertinent part:
[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen in the United States, and every
other male person residing in the United States, who, on the day or days
fixed for the first or any subsequent registration is between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration
at such time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be
determined by proclamation of the President and by the rules and regula-
tions prescribed hereunder. ...
I&
10. The court relied on Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1975), applying a
"middle tier" equal protection analysis. See infra text accompanying note 60.
The court decided only the issue of draft registration and stressed that in order
to avoid involvement in military affairs it was not deciding whether or to what
extent women should serve in combat. (Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586,
597 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
11. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1980).
12. 453 U.S. 64 (1980).
13. 453 U.S. at 82.
14. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and
Stevens joined the majority opinion. Justices White and Marshall filed separate
dissenting opinions. Justice Brennan joined in both dissents.
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whether the MSSA, by authorizing the President to require
males, but not females, to register for the draft, violated the
fifth amendment." He observed that when the Court is called
upon to judge the constitutionality of congressional actions, it is
not exercising primary judgment but is judging the acts of a co-
equal branch of government.'6 In accord with the Court's past
practices, the majority noted that because this case involved
Congress's authority over national defense and military affairs,
the Court was obliged to give even greater deference to this
enactment than the deference customarily afforded Congress."
Justice Rehnquist observed that Congress had expressly relied
on its constitutional power over military affairs'" in declining to
impose registration requirements on women.'9 He further noted
that the Court lacked competence in the area of military affairs
15. 453 U.S. at 64. See U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[N]or be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; ..."
16. Id See also Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17. 453 U.S. at 64. The Court acknowledged that its recent decisions afforded
deference to executive and congressional decisions in military affairs. Id. at
64-65. See Brown v. Glinis, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding regulations imposing a
prior restraint on military personnel's right to petition); Middendorf v. Henry,
424 U.S. 25 (1976) (recognizing that the Court must defer to Congress's
authority to regulate army and naval forces); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976) (upholding a ban on political speeches by civilians on a military base);
Schlessinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (holding in response to a due process
challenge by males contesting the Navy's policy of allowing females a longer
period than males in which to achieve promotions which are necessary to re-
main in the Navy, that men and women were not similarily situated); Packer v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (rejecting a vagueness and overbreadth challenge to
army regulations by reasoning that greater flexibility is allowed Congress when
it is regulating members of the military).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12: "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that use shall be
for a longer term than two years"; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13: "To provide
and maintain a Navy"; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14: "To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
19. 453 U.S. at 65. The Report of the Senate Armed Services Committee
stated:
Article 1 Sec. 8 of the Constitution commits exclusively to the Congress
the powers to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and
make rules for Government and regulation of the land and naval forces,
and pursuant to these powers it lies within the discretion of the congress
to determine the occasions for expansion of our Armed Forces, and the
means best suited to such expansion should it prove necessary.
S. REP. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 159-161 (1980); 126 CONG. REC.
S6531-S6533; 1980 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEws 2650.
1982]
Duquesne Law Review
and decisions."0 Justice Rehnquist stated that while Congress re-
mains subject to the due process clause, the tests and limitations
applied in the area of military affairs may be different. In resolv-
ing the issue before it, the Court acknowledged that it must
avoid substituting its considered opinion or appraisal of the
evidence for that of the legislative branch.2'
Justice Rehnquist rejected the plaintiffs' argument that regis-
tration involves civilians, not military personnel,22 and found that
registration is the first step in the military induction process.
Observing that congressional decisions concerning draft registra-
tion involve judgments on military operations and needs, he
asserted that the same deference afforded congressional judg-
ments in these areas should be applied to congressional decisions
concerning draft registration and induction." The majority re-
jected the government's argument that because this case involved
military affairs, in which Congress is accorded greater deference,
the Court should abandon the heightened scrutiny test that has
been applied in other gender-based discrimination cases24 and ap-
ply a test that would allow distinctions to be drawn which bear a
rational relationship to some legitimate government purpose.
Justice Rehnquist admonished that formulating the degrees of
deference to congressional judgments as well as designated
20. 453 U.S. 66. The Court cited Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). In
Gilligan, the Court held that there was no justiciable controversy where former
students of Kent State sought injunctive relief to prospectively restrain the
Governor from prematurely summoning the National Guard as they believed
was done in May of 1968 when four students were killed by guardsmen. The
Court recognized its lack of competence, but made it clear that it was not say-
ing that the conduct of the National Guard was beyond judicial review. Id at 5.
21. 453 U.S. at 67-68.
22. See Brief for Appellees at 19. The district court reasoned that because
this case did not concern day-to-day military operations, the court was not in-
truding into military and national defense affairs. 509 F. Supp. at 596. The
Supreme Court found the reasoning unpersuasive. 453 U.S. at 68.
23. 453 U.S. at 68.
24. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464
(1981). The Court in Michael M. applied a heightened scrutiny evaluation to test
whether a California statutory rape law discriminated against males under the
age of 18. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court in a plurality opinion,
upheld the law, which made it criminal to have sexual intercourse with a female
under 18 years of age, not the wife of the perpetrator. He held that subjecting
only men to ciminal responsibility was sufficiently related to the State's objec-
tives and therefore, the classification was not unconstitutional. Id at 476. See
also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1968) (declaring unconstitutional an Alabama
alimony law that allowed only payments to women).
[Vol. 20:519
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categories of scrutiny can result in mechanical categorizations
used simply to justify a result.25
Applying the test announced in Craig v. Boren," the Court
found it undeniable that the government has an important in-
terest in raising armies. Justice Rehnquist observed that when
the Court evaluates a congressional action in this area, it cannot
decide how it would act, but only whether the method chosen by
Congress denies equal protection. 7 Justice Rehnquist observed
that the Court had not adopted a different equal protection test
in the military context,' and acknowledged Congress's broad
constitutional authority to choose among well considered alter-
natives when raising and supporting an army.
The Court distinguished this case from several previous
gender-based discrimination cases because of the time and means
Congress had expended in considering other alternatives.'
Justice Rehnquist noted that after considering the alternatives,
both houses of Congress declined to allocate enough funds to the
Selective Service System to provide for the registration of
women." The Court therefore concluded that the decision to ex-
25. 453 U.S. at 69-70.
26. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
27. There is no equal protection clause applicable to the federal govern-
ment; however, the due process clause of the fifth amendment has been inter-
preted to include an equal protection component. Schlesinger v. Gallard, 419
U.S. 498, 500 n.3. (1975).
28. 453 U.S. at 70-71. Justice Rehnquist relied on Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975). In Schlesinger, the Court held that a military context did
not warrant a different equal protection test. 419 U.S. at 507.
29. 453 U.S. at 72. See Sen. Hearings on S. 2294; Hearings on National Ser-
vice Legislation before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The proposition of
registering women received not only national attention, but was also extensive-
ly considered by both Houses of Congress where the question of registering
women for the draft was discussed. See Hearings on National Service Legisla-
tion before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Committee
on Armed Services, 96th Congress, 2d Session (1980); See also House of
Representatives, Joint Resolution 521; 126 CONG. REC. S6546 (Sen. Nunn) (June
10, 1980).
30. 453 U.S. at 72-73. See House Subcommittee on Military Personnel of
the House Armed Services Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), and the Senate
Armed Services Comm., S. REP. No. 960226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1979) and
S. REP. No. 96-826, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979). While funds were being
allocated for the registration of males only, congressional committees held hear-
ing on the issue of registering women and ultimately rejected the proposal. 453
U.S. at 73. In doing so, both houses adopted the findings of Senate Report No.
826.
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empt women was not attributable to traditional stereotypes
placed upon women.'
Based upon an evaluation of the legislative history surround-
ing congressional actions in 1980, the majority concluded that the
purpose of draft registration was to prepare for the draft by pro-
viding a pool of potential inductees.2 Observing that women as a
group are not eligible for combat,33 Justice Rehnquist determined
that Congress decided to exclude women from draft registration
because if they were not eligible for combat there was no need
to register them. 4 He rejected the district court's assertion that
women were excluded because needs could be filled by men
alone, and held that men and women are not similarly situated
for purposes of draft registration because of the combat restric-
tions on women. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the exemp-
tion of women was closely related to the purpose of registration
and therefore did not contravene the due process clause. 6
The Court observed that Congress could focus on military
need rather than equity in regulating armies and navies.
31. 453 U.S. at 74. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1976) (Court
relied on a House Report to determine that favorable treatment to female over
male wage earners was not based upon the traditional way of thinking about
women).
32. 453 U.S. at 76. The Court noted that the stated purpose of the MSSA
was to provide for national security by ensuring a speedy and efficient method
of induction in case of an emergency. Also, because only those who register
may be drafted, it follows then that the purpose of registration is to provide a
pool for the draft. Finally, should a national emergency arise, a need for combat
troops would be the warranting factor for the draft. The Court cited Senate
Report No. 826.
33. 453 U.S. at 76. By statute, women in the Navy and the Air Force are
prohibited from participating in combat. Along with the Marine Corps, the
Army has an established policy against using women in combat. See 10 U.S.C.
§§ 6015 & 8549 (1976) and Presidential Recommendations for Selective Service
Reform - A Report to Congress. Prepared pursuant to Pub. L. 96-107 (Feb. 11,
1980).
34. 453 U.S. at 77. In part, the Senate Report read: "The policy precluding
the use of women in combat is, in the Committee's view, the most important
reason for not including women in a registration system." S. REP. No. 826,
supra n.33, at 157, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. AD. NEWS 1980, 2647.
35. 453 U.S. at 78. See 509 F. Supp. at 598.
36. 453 U.S. at 78-79. The Court stated: "The Constitution requires that
Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly, not that it engage in
gestures of superficial equality." Id. at 79.
37. Id at 79-80. Director of the Selective Service System, Bernard Rostker,
stated at the House Hearings that "the President's decision to ask for authority
to register women is based on equity." Hearings on National Service Legisla-
[Vol. 20:519
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Justice Rehnquist noted that the district court had relied on
testimony that 80,000 women could be used to fill noncombat
positions if a draft became necessary.38 The Court maintained
that in so reasoning, the district court exceeded its authority by
ignoring the congressional response to this rationale.39 The Court
found that Congress adequately considered the possibility of
drafting 80,000 women conscripts and that the rejection of this
proposal was within its constitutional authority." The Court, in re-
versing the district court's holding, held that when Congress
authorized the registration of men under the MSSA and excluded
women, it acted within its constitutional authority.4
Writing in dissent,42 Justice White pointed out that if the ex-
clusion of women from combat is constitutional and all positions
in time of war must be filled with combat-ready troops, there is
no reason to have women in the army at all.4" He disagreed with
the Court's apparent determination that Congress had concluded
that women could not be used in non-combat positions in times of
military need. 4 Justice White also disagreed with a majority
finding that Congress had concluded the number of women in
wartime that could serve in positions that would not affect
military flexibility could be met through volunteers." He sug-
tion Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Committee
on Armed Services, 96th Cong. 2d Sess (1980). The Senate Report reached the
conclusion that the support for registering women was based on principles of
equity rather than military need.
38. 453 U.S. at 81. Congress found that in the event of a draft, 650,000 in-
dividuals would need to be inducted in the first 6 months. See id. at 106 n.19
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 81. The court asserted that Congress had concluded that even if
a small number of women could be recruited for combat positions, it still would
not be worth the added burden of drafting and training them and that the need
for non-combat personal could be met by volunteers. See supra note 30 and ac-
companying text. The Court also noted that Congress had determined that the
use of women in non-combat positions would hamper military flexibility. The
Senate Report gave two reasons for this determination: (1) Non-combat troops
must be able to move into action if necessary, and (2) rotation of personnel is
essential. See supra note 30.
40. 453 U.S. at 82.
41. Id. at 83.
42. Justice Brennan joined in this dissent.
43. 453 U.S. at 83 (White, J., dissenting).
44. Id. See id at 76-77.
45. Id. at 83-84 (White, J., dissenting). Congress found that 80,000 women
could be used in the event of a need to conduct a draft. See supra note 30 & ac-
companying text.
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gested that the record was subject to different interpretations
and that the case should be remanded to determine whether
Congress adequately considered the possibility of filling 80,000
non-combat positions with women."6 Justice White stressed that
administrative convenience was not sufficient justification for
gener-based discrimination an d stated that he found no justifica-
tion for such discrimination here.47
Justice Marshall, also writing in dissent, 8 asserted that the
only issue presented was whether the exclusion of women from
registration violated the equal protection guarantees inherent in
the fifth amendment. 9 Justice Marshall asserted that the MSSA
must be held unconstitutional unless the government can prove,
under the test announced in Craig v. Boren, that the distinction
between the sexes is substantially related to the achievement of
an important government purpose. He noted that this test is ap-
plied regardless of whether the challenged classification
discriminates against males or females."0 He stated that although
Congress must be afforded great deference in military decisions,
the Court cannot allow this practice to prevent it from deciding
constitutional issues." Justice Marshall maintained that the
Court, in finding that Congress's actions were substantially
related to important government interests of effective defense,
inappropriately used the deference element in the equal protec-
tion analysis.52
46. 453 U.S. at 85 (White, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 85-86 (White, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined in this dis-
sent also.
49. Id. Justice Rehnquist framed the issue in the same manner. Justice
Marshall explained that male only registration violated women's right to equal
protection by denying them an opportunity to perform a civic obligation.
50. Id. at 87. (Marshall, J., dissenting). This is known as the "heightened"
scrutiny test. Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that there is no doubt
that the government has an important interest in national security areas and
that the real question was whether the exemption of women from draft
registration was substantially related to that interest.
51. Id at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Even the war power does not
remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties." United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 958, 263-64 (1967) (quoting Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blairsdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)).
52. 453 U.S. at 90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that
Congress recognized the important contributions made by women in the
military and had approved efforts to expand women's roles. U. S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (1980), p. 2647.
[Vol. 20:519
Recent Decisions
He observed that the government did not justify the preclu-
sion of women from draft registration because precluding women
from serving in the armed services is substantially related to the
effectiveness of the military. Justice Marshall concluded that the
justification for the gender-based classification must therefore be
based on considerations peculiar to the objectives of
registration.' He then stated that although the majority had pur-
ported to apply the Craig v. Boren test, it had instead employed
the different "similarly situated" test. In order for the govern-
ment to sustain its gender-based classification, Justice Marshall
maintained, the classification must do more than substantially ad-
vance important governmental interests: rather, the classifica-
tion itself must be substantially related to the achievement of
the asserted government interest. 4 Justice Marshall observed
that the government failed to do this because it made no claim
that its interest cannot be accomplished by registering both
sexes and drafting only males if necessary.55 Moreover, he
pointed out that although the majority's decision was based upon
the assumption that conscription would occur in the event of a
need for military mobilization, there is no guarantee that a peace
time draft will not be held.56
Justice Marshall also opined that the majority erred in basing
its analysis upon conscription rather than registration.5 7 This
53. 453 U.S. at 90-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He stated that even if the
government has an important interest in excluding women from combat, there
is no reason for the majority to believe that exempting them from draft
registration is substantially related to the interest. Id. Justice Marshall pointed
to the Senate Report, see supra note 30, which stated that the major purpose
for excluding women from registration was the policy against using women in
combat.
54. 453 U.S. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall believed, see
infra note 96 and accompanying text, that under the Craig v. Boren test the
Government must show that registering women would substantially impair its
efforts to prepare for a draft. 453 U.S. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. 453 U.S. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. Marshall stated, "This difficulty comes about because both Congress
and the Court have lost sight of the important distinction between registration
and conscription. Registration provides 'an inventory of what the available
strength is within the military qualified pool in this country.'" Reinstitution of
Procedures for Registration Under the Military Selective Service Act: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1980) (Selective Service Hear-
ings) (statement of General Rogers). Conscription supplies the military with the
1982]
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dissenter also proposed that the premise that every draftee must
be available for combat duty is clearly false and unsupported by
the record.' He then considered the majority's discussion of
"equity" versus "military need". 9 Justice Marshall concluded
that the House Hearings showed not only that equity favors
registration, but that drafting women was consistent with
military effectiveness.0 Because both male and female conscripts
could perform equally in certain positions, Justice Marshall con-
cluded that whether Congress could subordinate the equal pro-
tection requirement that similarly situated persons be treated
similarly depended on what was meant by "military need". He
maintained that the absence of "military need", in the sense that
a war could be successfully fought without conscripting women,
was constitutionally irrelevant.61 Justice Marshall further
asserted that because the purpose of registration is to provide a
pool of inductees in the event needs cannot be met otherwise,
the current supply of female volunteers could not be used to
justify excluding women from registration.2
Acknowledging that military flexibility is indeed an important
government interest, this dissenter maintained that although the
Senate Report stated that a large number of women inductees
would interfere with flexibility, there was nothing in the record
to support a conclusion that a limited number of women would
personnel needed to respond to a particular exigency. Justice Marshall stated
the fact that registration law expressly discriminating between men and women
may be justified by a valid conscription program which would, in retrospect,
make the current discrimination appear functionally related to the program
that emerged. 453 U.S. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. 453 U.S. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall pointed out
that the record established that women could fill many non-combat positions in
the event of mobilization. Id. at 98-101 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Id at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority held that Congress
acted within its constitutional powers by considering military need rather than
equity. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
60. 453 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra note 30. Justice
Marshall quoted Assistant Secretary Pierce: "Since women have proven that
they can serve successfully as volunteers in the Armed Forces, equity suggests
that they be liable to serve as draftees if conscription is reinstated." 453 U.S. at
102 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall explained that equity here is
synonomous with the guarantee of equal protection.
61. 453 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that it
is not the plaintiff's burden to prove that women would be necessary in the
event of mobilization. Id.
62. Id
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impair flexibility." In reviewing the record, Justice Marshall con-
cluded that even with the deference due Congress in military af-
fairs, the Court improperly held that the government met its
burden of proving that its decision to exclude a limited number
of women from the draft was substantially related to an impor-
tant government interest." He concluded that by doing so, the
Court unjustifiably relied on the deference due Congress to
avoid its duty of enforcing the Constitution and instead ac-
comodated an act of Congress."5
In Rostker v. Goldberg the Supreme Court for the first time
was faced with the issue of whether the MSSA66 unconstitu-
tionally discriminated against males by excluding women from
draft registration. In resolving the constitutional issue the
Court applied the gender-based discrimination test established in
Craig v. Boren while paying deference to legislative decision-
making." While both the majority opinion and Justice Marshall's
63. Id. at 106-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall provided quotes
from the Senate Report which in his opinion provided evidence that in con-
cluding that 80,000 women could be used in the event of mobilization, the
Defense Department took into account military flexibility. He also believed that
if drafting women would impair flexibility, then the increasing amount of
women volunteers also impedes flexibility, yet Congress has passed legislation
allowing for more females in the Armed Services. Id. at 453 n.7 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). He also interpreted the Senate Report as saying that military flex-
ibility would be impaired only if the draft were conducted randomly from a pool
of both sexes. The Senate Report did not cover the possibility of a limited draft
because the MSSA does not provide for separate drafts from each sexual
category.
64. Id. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to Justice Marshall, the
Senate Report only establishes that drafting a large number of women would
impair military flexibility.
65. Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. The MSSA has been attacked on other grounds: United States v. Dray,
427 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1970) (selective service found not to interfere with the
right to life); United States v. Craft, 423 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1970) (registration
found not to interfere with the free exercise of religion); United States v. Doris,
319 F. Supp. 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (found not to be unconstitutionally
discriminatory to males who are between 181/2 and 26 years of age).
. 67. Plaintiffs' specific assertion was that because the exclusion of women
made the pool of draftees smaller in number, each individual who must register
for the draft had a better chance of being drafted.
68. See Roberts, Gender-Based Draft Registration, Congressional Policy
and Equal Protection: A Proposal for Deferential Middle-Tier Review, 36
WAYNE L. REV. 35 (1980). Professor Roberts, writing before the Supreme Court
rendered its decision, suggested that the Court should apply a deferential
middle-tier when deciding Rostker v. Goldberg.
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dissenting opinion agreed that this was the correct test, the opi-
nions disagreed on the interpretation of the record before the
Court. Consequently, both opinions applied the same test and
reached different results. 9
As the Supreme Court has recognized, deference must be af-
forded to congressional decisions in all areas." The Court has
traditionally decided to afford great weight to congressional
decisions concerning military affairs and national defense
because of its admitted lack of competence in decision-making in
this area. In United States v. O'Brien7 a defendant was con-
victed for burning his draft card." Rejecting the defendant's
claim that the law prohibiting mutilation of draft cards un-
constitutionally abriged the constitutional right to freedom of
speech,73 the Supreme Court recognized Congress's broad powers
in the area of military affairs.74 In Gilligan v. Morgan"5 the Court
recognized that the conduct of the National Guard is subject to
judicial review, but criticized the court of appeals for failing to
give due deference to congressional decisions in this area."
Although stated in dicta, this laid the foundation for the ap-
proach in examining congressional enactments in the area of
military affairs.
Finally, in Schlesinger v. Ballard,77 a male naval officer was
subject to mandatory discharge because he failed, for a second
69. See supra notes 26, 36, 50 & 55 and accompanying text.
70. See C.B.S. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94 (1974). In CBS the
Court held that it was not unconstitutional for CBS to refuse to sell time to per-
sons wishing to speak out against Vietnam War. In doing so, the Court deferred
to the congressional decisions in communications areas.
71. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
72. Defendant was charged with violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b) (1976)
which reads: "Any person ... who forges, alters, knowingly mutilates or in any
manner changes any such certificate (draft card) or any notation duly and valid-
ly inscribed thereon ... shall, upon conviction, be fined not to exceed $10,000 or
be imprisoned for not more than five years or both." I&
73. 391 U.S. at 376. The defendant asserted that the statute was aimed at
public displays, and thus, contravened first amendment rights.
74. Id at 377. "The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support
armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and
sweeping." (Citations omitted). The Court continued, "The power of Congress to
classify and conscript manpower for military service is 'beyond question.'"
(Citations omitted). Id.
75. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
76. Id at 10-11.
77. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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time, to be promoted to lieutenant commander."8 He asserted
that the mandatory discharge statute unconstitutionally
discriminated between males and females because females were
given an additional four years for which to attain the
promotion." In analyzing the issue, the Court looked to the
legislative history to determine the purpose behind Congress's
decision to enact the law. The Court then acknowledged Con-
gress's broad constitutional powers in military affairs and upheld
the statute after analyzing it with the increased amount of
deference due in this area."
In equal protection analyses the Court has traditionally ap-
plied two standards of review. A "strict scrutiny test" is applied
where the legislature has adopted a statute that either on its
face or through its administration has discriminated against a
suspect class. In these types of cases the distinction between
classes of people can only be upheld if the Court determines that
such a distinction is necessary to promote a compelling state in-
terest. 1 Second, the Court has applied the "traditional" test
where it cannot find a suspect class that has been discriminated
against. The Court will uphold the legislation as long as it bears
a rational relation to some legitimate government interest.82
The Supreme Court has encountered difficulty in determining
78. Id 10 U.S.C. § 6382 (1976) provides:
(a) Each officer on the active list of the Navy serving in the grade of
lieutenant, except an officer in the Nurse Corps, and each officer on the
active list on the Marine Corps serving in the grade of Captain shall be
honorably discharged on June 30 of the fiscal year in which he is con-
sidered as having failed of selection for promotion to the grade of lieute-
nant commander of major for the second time. However, if he so requests,
he may be honorable discharged at any time during the fiscal year .... (d)
"This section does not apply to women officers appointed under section
5590 of this title or to officers designated for limited duty.
Id.
79. 419 U.S. at 500.
80. Id at 503-505. The Court found that because women had listed oppor-
tunities in certain activities such as combat or sea duty, they could not compile
the same service records as males. Thus, in order to provide equal opportunity
for promotion, Congress allowed women a longer time to attain credentials that
will entitle them to be selected for promotion.
81. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
82. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). The Court in a per
curiam opinion upheld a local ordinance that banned operation of pushcarts in
the French Quarter of New Orleans, except for those who had done so con-
tinuously for eight or more years.
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which approach to take in deciding cases involving sex
discrimination" due to uncertainty over whether females were a
suspect class.' Until 1971, the Court utilized the traditional test
in analyzing equal protection claims based upon sex discrimina-
tion because it did not consider women a suspect class." Then,
the so-called "middle-tier""6 test evolved when the Court deter-
mined that distinctions based on sex are not inherently suspect,
but necessitate a higher standard of review than that afforded
by the traditional test.
The roots of this middle-tier analysis were laid in Reed v.
Reed,88 where an intestate's mother challenged an Idaho statute
which provided that in the case of relatives in equal relationship
to the deceased, preference will be given to males for appoint-
ment as administrator of the deceased's estate. The plaintiff
claimed that the statute contravened the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment because it discriminated on the
basis of sex. In declaring the statute unconstitutional, the Reed
Court recognized that legislatively imposed sex classifications
are subject to scrutiny by the courts,9 and determined that in
gender-based discrimination cases it will determine if the classifi-
cation is substantially related to the purpose of the legislation.
83. See, Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464
(1981); supra note 24.
84. Fronterio v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Justice Brennan, author of
the plurality opinion, deemed females a suspect class. A majority of the Court,
however, has never embraced this view.
85. See Hoyt v. Flouder, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (sustaining a law placing women
on a jury list only if they make a special request); and Goesaut v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a law denying a bartender's license to women).
86. For an examination of the evolution of "middle tier" review, see
Roberts, supra note 68, at 51.
87. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1973). The gender-based classifica-
tion must be rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate government
objective.
88. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed is the first case that held that discrimination
on the basis of sex violates equal protection. See also Roberts, supra n.68, at 45.
89. IDAHO CODE §§ 15-312, 15-314 (1966).
90. 404 U.S. at 72.
91. Id at 75. The court stated: "A classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relationship to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id at 76. (Citations omitted).
"The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship
to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by the operation of secs.
15-312 and 15-314." Id at 76.
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In Schlesinger v. Ballard the Court applied the Reed analysis
in deciding that Congress could have enacted a gender-based
retirement law in order to achieve its objective of giving women
an equal opportunity to advance in the armed services."
Although Reed and Schlesinger laid the goundwork for sex-
discrimination analyses, they did not articulate the test that was
applied by the Rostker Court.
The standard of review in sex discrimination applied by the
majority in Rostker v. Goldberg was established in Craig v.
Boren.93 The plaintiff in Craig challenged an Oklahoma law' that
prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21
and females under the age of 18." The Craig Court recognized
the Reed line of cases and established that in sex-discrimination
cases the classification must serve important government objec-
tives." The Rostker Court rejected the idea that it should apply
a refined traditional test because of the deference due Congress,
but rather chose to apply the middle-tier approach while
recognizing the appropriate deference due Congress in its choice
of alternatives.97
By adopting the middle-tier test in Rostker, the Court is rein-
forcing the ideal that this standard of review is applicable no
matter which sex is asserting the constitutional claim. 8 The
92. See supra note 19 and infra 98-102 & accompanying text.
93. 421 U.S. 190 (1976).
94. OKLA. STAT., tit. 37, 241 & 245 (1972).
95. The plaintiff asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court held
that the case was moot as to Craig because he became 21 before disposition of
the case. The Court held, however, that plaintiff Whitence, a seller of 3.2%
beer, had standing to make an equal protection challenge.
96. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1975). The Court in Craig stated: "To
withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and be substantially
related to the achievement of these objectives." Id. The Craig Court held that
the statute in question served an important government interest by seeking to
prevent drunken driving; however, the Court held that the classification failed
to be substantially related to that interest. Thus, the Supreme Court held that
because the State of Oklahoma's interest of promoting road safety, the statute
was unconstitutional.
97. Professor Roberts suggests this approach in his article. See Roberts,
supra note 68. The majority admonished that "announced degrees of 'deference'
to legislative judgments, just as levels of 'scrutiny' which this Court announces
that it applies to particular classifications made by legislative body, may all to
readily become facile abstractions used to justify a result." 453 U.S. 69-70.
98. Justice Marshall expressly acknowledges this in his dissenting opinion,
see supra text accompanying note 50.
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Supreme Court, therefore, appears to view the sexes as being
equal. This conclusion can be drawn by looking at other equal
protection challenges to classifications based on race, where the
minority, e.g. blacks," are entitled to strict scrutiny in classifica-
tions that burden them, while the majority, whites, 00 have their
racial-based equal protection claims analyzed under the tradi-
tional test. The theory behind the use of two standards is that
the majority can protect itself by virtue of its power of the ballot
box, while the minority groups need protection by the courts.''
In order to afford this protection, the Court scrutinizes the ac-
tions of the representatives of the majority harsher when they
burden members of a minority. Because the Court will apply the
middle-tier standard of review in gender-based equal protection
challenges, no matter who asserts the claim, it apparently views
neither sex as needing additional protection when burdened.
In applying a deferential middle-tier review'02 to the equal pro-
tection challenge in Rostker, the Court reinforced its position in
gender-based discrimination challenges. In adhering to the Craig
test rather than adopting a new standard due to the military
context, the Court demonstrated to the lower courts that it has
99. Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court struck down anti-
miscegenation statute. While the statute punished both races equally, the Court
held that the statute was subject to strict scrutiny because the purpose of the
statute was to promote white Supremacy, and thus, the state was adopting a
policy which burdened other races.
100. See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), where the Court
upheld a plan which split a white majority voting district into two non-white
majority districts even though the New York legislature made the apportion-
ment on the basis of race. But see Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, the Supreme Court was faced with a white male's
constitutional challenge of an affirmative action program on equal protection
grounds.
Justice Powell, in a plurality opinion, held that if a classification denies equal
opportunities or benefits enjoyed by other because of race then the classifica-
tion must be regarded as suspect. However, this holding may be limited to cir-
cumstances where the classification excludes race from benefits entirely rather
than just giving a preference to the minority race. Justice Powell stated that an
admissions program that did not impose quotas but considered race for diversi-
ty purposes would not be unconstitutional. Thus, the strict scrutiny test would
not be applicable to uphold a diversity policy. On the other hand, one would
doubt whether a policy by the state giving admission advantages to whites
would not be subject to strict scrutiny.
101. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 97.
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settled upon a standard of review in the equal protection
challenges to gender-based discrimination. By doing so, the Court
has provided guidance, predictability, and stability to lower
courts in an area certain to be actively involved in future litiga-
tion.
Michael B. Sedlock

